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Ken SHIGETA (Osaka University)  
 
Skepticism of Knowledge 
-Conflict between Wittgenstein and Descartes-∗ 
 
 
This thesis has two primary aims. The first involves providing a critique of the method 
of doubt that Descartes presents in Meditationes from a perspective based in the philosophy 
of Wittgenstein (especially On Certainty (OC)). I propose that it is only after Cartesian doubt 
is subjected to criticism that we can dissolve, rather than solve, the skeptical paradox caused 
by the doubt (§I~VI). The second goal of this thesis is to identify the fatal defect in 
Wittgenstein’s argument that emerges from the opposite perspective, that is, one based in 
Descartes’ argument. I will critique Wittgenstein from the perspective of the corrected 
Cartesian argument and elucidate the consequent genuine insight (§VII). 
In short, I will attempt to criticize Descartes via Wittgenstein and criticize Wittgenstein 
via Descartes with regard to the theory of knowledge. I propose that a revised theory of 
knowledge should rest on the insights suggested by both philosophers. In this thesis, I will 
attempt to take a step, however small, in this direction. 
 
 
I. Criticism of Cartesian doubt via the philosophy of Wittgenstein 
According to epistemological skepticism, I might be dreaming now or exist as a brain in a 
vat (BIV). A skeptical conclusion about knowledge of the external world can also arise from 
the premise C1, that is, I do not know “I am not dreaming (not a BIV) now.” Pessimistic 
critics (e.g., P. F. Strawson, B. Stroud) consider the refutation of C1 to be impossible, 
whereas others have attempted to directly refute C1 (e.g., G. E. Moore, H. Putnam, C. 
Wright) and some (e.g., F. Dretske, R. Nozick) have attempted to refute the closure principle 
of knowledge used in the demonstration while allowing for the validity of C1. Another 
scholar, M. Williams, maintains that the skeptical demonstration is true only if we 
presuppose the epistemological premise that we choose to accept or reject at will. Most 
critics tend to adopt a strategy that allows them to effectively avoid the skeptical 
consequence while accepting the validity of C1. 
                                                  
∗ This paper is originally based on a manuscript (“Dissolving the Skeptical Paradox of Knowledge via 
Cartesian Skepticism based on Wittgenstein”) which I have presented in the XXII World Congress of 
Philosophy (at Seoul National University, 3rd August 2008) and is rewritten by adding large 
modifications and newly written part to it. 
This work was supported by Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (Start-up) (19820012). 
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However, it is difficult to say whether these attempts have succeeded; in my opinion, 
they have been unsuccessful1 because their concession to Descartes’ argument is insufficient. 
Such failure might also derive from the incompleteness of Descartes’ own method of doubt. 
The first aim of this thesis, perhaps somewhat paradoxically, is to show that the skeptical 
paradox about knowledge can be dissolved only if Cartesian skepticism is extended far 
beyond the reach of his attempt. This argument is based on important arguments in 
Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. 
 
 
II. Skeptical paradox about a posteriori knowledge 
In his Meditationes, Descartes arrived at the concept of certain knowledge (i.e., “I think”) 
through three stages of methodological doubt: [1] doubt about knowledge gained through 
perception, [2] the dream argument, and [3] the assumption of Damon. Before examining the 
failure of Descartes’ demonstration, we will formulate the skeptical paradoxes corresponding 
to stages [2] and [3]. 
First, I will formulate the epistemological paradox corresponding to stage [2]; that is, 
epistemological skepticism about the external world in general. This can be referred to as 
skepticism about a posteriori knowledge (SDr)2. Given the notation that S = “I sit in front of 
the desk,” Dr = “I am dreaming now,” K = “I know ~”, then 
 
(1) ￢K(￢Dr)     (conclusion of dream argument; C1) 
(2) K(S→￢Dr)     (reasoning based on the concepts) 
(3) (x)(y) [{K(x)∧K(x→y)}→K(y)]     (the principle of closure) 
(4) K(S)     (assumption) 
(5) K(￢Dr)     ((2), (3), (4)) 
(6) ￢K(￢Dr) ∧K (￢Dr)     ((1),(5)) 
 
Thus, a contradiction emerges. At this stage, K(S) must be denied because K(S) is the only 
assumption in this proof. So, 
 
(7) ￢K(S) 
 
At this stage of methodological doubt (stage [2]), a priori knowledge cannot be the target of 
doubt. Therefore, denial of K(S), which is not based on logical inference, seems to be natural. 
                                                  
1 In this thesis, I will not directly note flaws in the arguments of the critics to which I refer, with the 
exception of Wright. However, I expect that such flaws will become self-evident when the essence of 
this thesis is understood and the detailed criticism of Wright’s argument (cf. footnote 7) is explained.    
2 In this thesis, I abbreviate the inference described below, which draws a skeptical conclusion about a 
posteriori knowledge, as SDr. 
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In the service of enhancing understanding of the argument that follows, I must underscore a 
remarkable feature of this paradoxical reasoning (SDr). SDr is such that the conclusion is 
incompatible with common sense. In contrast to the demonstration that follows, this 
demonstration does not contain any logical defects. 
 
 
III. The Skeptical paradox about a priori knowledge3 
Next, I will formulate the paradox corresponding to stage [3], epistemological skepticism 
about knowledge that might be indefeasible even after the dream argument, such as 
knowledge concerning mathematics, logic, and epistemic schema, and that can therefore be 
called skepticism about a priori knowledge (SDa)4. Given the notation that M = “2 + 3 = 5,” 
and Da (x) = “I am deceived by Damon about x (x = a belief in a priori content),” the same 
reasoning used in relation to SDr, produces ￢K (M). 
 
[SDa: Inference of skepticism about a priori knowledge] 
(1)´ ￢K(￢Da(M))     (conclusion from the assumption of Damon) 
(2)´ K(M→￢Da(M))     (reasoning based on the concepts) 
(3)   (x)(y) [{K(x)∧K(x→y)}→K(y)]     (the principle of closure) 
(4)´ K(M)     (assumption) 
(5)´ K(￢Da(M))     ((2)´, (3), (4)´) 
(6)´ ￢K(￢Da(M))∧K (￢Da(M))     ((1)´, (5)´) 
(7)´ ￢K(M) 
 
However, because this inference, unlike SDr, derives the denial of a kind of a priori 
knowledge (= M), all of the same kind of knowledge (e.g., (1)´, (2)´, (3)) will also be denied 
based on the same type of inference described above5 . To avoid this situation, the 
conjunction of the three premises ((1)´, (2)´, (3)) must be denied6 because if this conjunction 
is accepted, the inference must lead to the unfortunate consequence noted. Thus, the 
conjunction of the three premises is denied in the case of SDa. In contrast to SDr, SDa is 
problematic with regard not only to its conclusion(￢K(M)) but also to the inference itself, 
which contains a logical deficiency7. 
                                                  
3 I obtained many ideas about the following paradox which is distinguished sharply from SDr, from C. 
Wright (1991), pp.101–113.    
4 Consistent with SDr, I abbreviate the inference described below, which draws a skeptical conclusion 
about a priori knowledge, as SDa. 
5 If we substitute “M” in SDa with “￢K(￢Da(M))” ((1)´), “M→￢Da(M)” (the scope of the cognitive 
operator K in (2)´), “(x)(y) [{K(x)∧K(x→y)}→K(y)]”((3)), we can reach the denial or the equivalence 
of the denial of them (“ ￢ K( ￢ K( ￢ Da(M)))”, “ ￢ K(M→ ￢ Da(M))”, “ ￢ K[(x)(y) 
[{K(x)∧K(x→y)}→K(y)]]”)  
6 Therefore, ￢(￢K(￢Da(M)) ∧ K(M→￢Da(M)) ∧ (x)(y)[{K(x)∧K(x→y)}→K(y)]). 
7 From this, Wright derives the denial of ￢K(￢Da(M)). However, the reason that he provides is not 
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very convincing (cf. Wright (1991), p.107). 
Because it is very helpful for understanding the following argument and very significant as an 
attempt to criticize skepticism itself, I will outline the argument developed by Wright (1991) in some 
detail and underscore the difficulty with this argument. After demonstrating that the conjunction of 
three premises ((1)´ and (2)´, (3)) must be denied, Wright advances his argument as follows:  
 
α. Of the three premises, only (1)´(￢K (￢Da(M))) can be denied.  
 
The truth of a priori knowledge, which was the target of doubt under Damon’s assumption, will be 
demonstrated by this claim because one of the premises of the reasoning (SDa) behind the skeptical 
conclusion about a priori knowledge is denied inα. Beyond that, he claims: 
 
β. From denial of (1)´, denial of premise (1) (￢K (￢Dr)) of SDr can be drawn and, at the least, 
the unwarrantable status of (1) can be drawn. 
 
For the same reason asα, skeptical doubt about a posteriori knowledge, the target of doubt in the 
dream argument, can be eliminated byβ. 
However, in my opinion, the argument by which Wright drawsαandβis vulnerable. First, I will 
examine the argument that concludes inα. Wright attempts to drawαsolely by concentrating on the 
validity of both (2)´ (K (M→￢Da(M))) and (3) (the principle of closure) under the assumption of the 
externalism about knowledge (though the assumption itself seems quite sound). However, he never 
shows the direct basis on which (1)´ (￢K (￢Da(M))) is denied. That is, he never shows the positive 
basis on which K (￢Da(M)) is affirmed, which is denial of (1)´. He manages only to justify the denial 
of (1)´ in a negative or eliminative way.  
However, the most serious difficulty arises in the argument in which he drawsβ. Let us assume that 
the argument that concludesαis indeed valid. Intuitively, (1)´ would seem to be the most natural and 
easiest of the three premises to deny. When we examine the argument by which Wright drawsβ, we 
should note that the logical deficiency induced by SDa can be avoided only if we can deny (1)´ and SDr 
does not include a logical deficiency from the beginning.  
However, if SDr cannot be denied, then skepticism about a posteriori knowledge will persist. Wright 
attempts to explore transcending the skepticism by deriving the denial of (1) on the basis of the denial 
of (1)´(=α).  
Although his argument is quite complicated, it can be summarized as follows. The denial of (1)´ 
(K (￢Da(M))) and the affirmation of (1)(￢K (￢Dr)) are logically incompatible because it seems 
quite strange that I could not know whether I am now dreaming despite knowing I am not being 
deceived by Damon about the a priori content. At this point, Wright makes a concession and advances 
his argument further. Even though we cannot demonstrate the logical incompatibility of the denial of 
(1)´ and the affirmation of (1), we must accept that it is impossible to justify the denial of their logical 
incompatibility. He shows that, based on this fact, the unwarrantability (not the denial) of (1) can be 
derived. Because SDr includes at least one unwarrantable premise, the reasoning cannot be considered 
valid.  
My diagnosis about this ingenious argument of Wright’s is as follows. We can demonstrateβon the 
basis ofαonly if we can positively demonstrate the denial of (1)´ (K (￢Da(M))). Without satisfying 
this condition (which Wright’s argument does not), the demonstration ofαandβare completely 
independent of each other. To escape the skepticism about a posteriori knowledge, we must produce an 
argument quite different fromα, but Wright never produces an argument of this sort. 
What kind of argument can be considered as valid for positively affirming the denial of (1)´ (K (￢
Da(M)))? Under what conditions can we ground a priori knowledge (e.g., knowledge of arithmetic) 
without any room for doubt? Such conditions would be realized if and only if there were a solid 
foundation (Bedeutungskörper) for prescribing the perfect rule about how to use arithmetic signs (e.g., 
“＋”) such that no room for doubt about correct comprehension of the meaning would remain. Under 
these circumstances, we would have valid grounds to deny only (1)´ among the three premises in SDa 
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IV. Cartesian doubt based on Wittgenstein 
I will use Wittgenstein’s argument to carry the method of doubt to its logical conclusion to 
dissolve these skeptical paradoxes. Indeed, Cartesian doubt is insufficient in the following 
way. If Damon’s assumption makes it possible to suspect a priori knowledge such as “2 + 3 
= 5,” it is also possible to be deceived by Damon about the reasoning and the meaning of the 
very words used in the process that lead to indefeasible knowledge: “I think.”8 Therefore, 
even “I think” cannot be indefeasible knowledge that escapes doubt. 
Then, does indefeasible knowledge that escapes all logically possible doubt not exist? 
The reply to this question is this: Indefeasible knowledge that escapes all logically possible 
doubt cannot exist because whatever is entitled to be called  “knowledge” must be 
expressible in language and, in principle, no use of words can be exempted from Damon’s 
deception. Thus, it seems that the discussion about knowledge reaches a dead end at this 
point. However, it is not until we have pursued Cartesian doubt to this point that we can 
productively consider knowledge. Wittgenstein’s familiar remark provides a significant clue 
for further investigation: 
 
“If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The 
game of doubting itself presupposes certainty” (OC §115). 
 
What lesson should we abstract from this passage? It cannot be “Indefeasible knowledge that 
escapes all logically possible doubt does exist.” The argument described above has already 
                                                                                                                                
(; ∴α). Moreover, it would become possible to grasp the concept of dreaming in an infallible way. 
Therefore, it would be impossible to misjudge whether the world we are experiencing is real (; ∴β). 
However the ground from which Wright draws the denial of (1)´(K (￢Da(M))) is not of such a 
positive kind. (In the context of rule-following considerations, Wittgenstein thoroughly criticizes the 
existence of the substance of meaning. That is, he shows the impossibility of grounding the denial of 
(1)´ in the positive way described above. Moreover, it is clear in his thesis and other works that Wright 
accepts the conclusions of rule-following considerations). The basis on which Wright justifies the 
denial of (1)´ is negative and is required in order to escape the logical deficiency induced by SDa. We 
can escape the deficiency only if we deny (1)´. Therefore, we cannot use the requirement to evade the 
logical difficulty of SDa as the basis to deny premise (1) of SDr. 
When we deny one premise in SDa, (1)´, because we are required to evade the logical difficulty 
induced by SDa, the difficulty of SDa completely disappears. Therefore, without the argument that 
grounds the denial of (1)´ except or beyond it, it is impossible to deny (1) of SDa. However, admitting 
the validity of rule-following considerations, as Wright does, renders it impossible to show the other 
grounds for denying (1) of SDa. Thus, at most, Wright can only satisfy himself with escaping from the 
skepticism about a priori knowledge induced by SDa.  
More drastic and fatal criticism of his argument (it seems quite probable) is criticism claiming that 
all that can be derived on the basis of his argument is the denial of the conjunction of the three premises 
((1)´, (2)´, and (3)) because he has never shown positive grounds for denying only (1)´ of three 
premises. There seems to be no other argument that positively grounds the denial of (1)´ but assumes 
the existence of the substance of meaning and of its infallible comprehension, the possibility of which 
Wittgenstein decisively criticizes.  
8 This type of criticism of Descartes is found in, for example, Iida (1987), p.77.  
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shown that there is no basis for such a claim. The lesson that we can derive from this remark 
would be conditional: “Any linguistic action (e.g., doubting) emerges in some way or 
another only if knowledge (or cognition) exists.” However, the criteria for knowledge cannot 
be Cartesian because these epistemological criteria do not allow for the existence of 
knowledge. In short, non-Cartesian criteria must be introduced—or, more precisely, have 
been introduced into our language game—if knowledge actually comes to exist or if the 
existence of knowledge cannot be denied. 
I will confirm the meaning of this lesson and how we can derive it from the previous 
argument. I have concluded that indefeasible knowledge that escapes all logically possible 
doubt cannot exist (= P0) by extending the method of doubt to its conclusion. Hence, one 
question arises: what is this conclusion (= P0)? Is it knowledge or not? We can assume that 
Damon’s deception applies to the deductive rule by which we derive the proposition (= P0) 
and the rule (= meaning) by which we use the word in the inference. Therefore, I can 
conclude that 
 
I do not know that P0. (= P1) 
 
Of course, we can conclude that P1 
 
I do not know that P1. (= P2) 
 
There is no end to this regressive process. 
 
← ……. do not know that I don’t know that I don’t know that I don’t know that P0. 
 
This argument shows that we can never achieve a substantial assertion because it might be 
subjected to doubt insofar as we adopt Cartesian criteria for knowledge. Thus, we cannot 
suspend a decision about whether we accept cognitions as knowledge. If we grant such 
acceptance, we must also acknowledge that non-Cartesian epistemological criteria have been 
introduced or have been tacitly adopted previously9. Even if individuals harbor Cartesian 
criteria and choose to keep this silent, they are tacitly introducing non-Cartesian criteria 
despite their Cartesian cognitions if they enjoy any cognitions during their silence. 
Indeed, because cognition emerges irrespective of our preferences, we must ac- 
                                                  
9 This fact does not mean that Cartesian criteria for knowledge cannot play any role in normal 
linguistic exchange. From this fact, it follows only that the criteria cannot be placed, either implicitly or 
explicitly, at the most exterior side (at the left side) as a cognitive operator. I will provide further 
detailed explanation for example, in footnote 13. 
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knowledge the existence of criteria for knowledge that are different from those of Descartes. 
This represents the most significant suggestion that can be abstracted from Wittgenstein’s 
foregoing passage. 
 
 
V. Recurring everyday knowledge 
What are the new and essentially non-Cartesian epistemological criteria that have already 
been introduced into our language game? Wittgenstein’s suggestion is also significant here10. 
The new criteria derive from his argument as follows:11 
 
(1) One can show grounds or evidence for believing a certain belief. 
(2) There is no counterevidence for such grounds or evidence. 
(3) There is no evidence that supports rejection of the belief or acceptance of an 
incompatible belief. 
 
For example, I believe that I have two hands. My hands can be shown to those who doubt 
this belief. Of course, it is always logically possible for us to hypothesize that these hands 
might be elaborate imitations that have been substituted without my awareness. It is also 
possible for us to suppose that the hands that I perceive are merely a hallucination projected 
by my BIV. However, empirical evidence in support of beliefs that are incompatible with the 
belief that “I have two hands” has not been presented thus far. Therefore, it can be said that I 
know that I have two hands. 
 
 
VI. Dissolving the skeptical paradox 
I will briefly confirm how the aforementioned considerations can dissolve the 
skeptical paradox by identifying a clear distinction between two usages of the word, 
knowing. The use of knowing to mean “knowing certainly in a sense of having 
escaped any logical doubt” (the use of knowing that satisfies Cartesian criteria) can 
be referred to as metaphysical usage (Km). On the other hand, the everyday usage 
of knowing, as elaborated in Section V, can be termed ordinary usage (Ko)12. Thus, 
                                                  
10 Cf. OC§4, 93, 117–120. 
11 These new criteria are only provisional and need greater refinement and sophistication. However, if 
my previous argument is valid, I can say that the new criteria must satisfy at least following conditions 
 
1. That, unlike Cartesian criteria, it is logically possible for these criteria to be satisfied.  
2. That it is empirically possible for us to judge whether the criteria are satisfied. 
3. That the criteria are in accord with most, if not all, cases of the ordinary usage of “know.”  
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the previous skeptical paradox (SDa) can be rewritten as: 
 
[DSa: Dissolving Skepticism about a priori knowledge] 
(1)＊ ￢Km(￢Da(M))     (conclusion from the assumption of Damon) 
(2)＊ Ko(M→￢Da(M))     (reasoning based on the concepts) 
(3)＊ (x)(y)[{Ko(x)∧Ko(x→y)}→Ko(y)] 
(4)＊ Ko(M)     (grounded calculation) 
(5)＊ Ko(￢Da(M))     ((2)＊, (3)＊, (4)＊) 
[(6)＊ ￢Km(￢Da(M))∧ Ko(￢Da(M))] 
 
Ko(￢Da(M)) is concluded from (2)＊, (3)＊, and (4)＊, and this is not contradictory to  
￢Km(￢Da(M)). Therefore, the conclusion of ￢Ko(M) is not drawn13. When introducing 
this distinction, the paradoxical conclusions of SDa (￢((1)´∧(2)´∧(3)) are also not drawn. 
                                                                                                                                
12 Wittgenstein said, “I would like to reserve the expression ‘I know’ for the cases in which it is used in 
normal linguistic exchange” (OC§260). I would rather like to say, “I could not help but reserve the 
expression ‘I know’ in normal linguistic exchange.” 
13 Indeed, ￢Km (Da(M)) is also knowledge in the sense that can be expressed in the form of Ko (￢
Km(￢Da(M)). But even if this notation is used, no inconsistencies are produced. As a precautionary 
measure, I will show the inference by means of the revised notation. 
 
[DSa2: Dissolving Skepticism about a priori knowledge ] 
(1) Ko(￢Km(￢Da(M)))     (conclusion from the assumption of Damon) 
(2) Ko(M→￢Da(M))     (reasoning based on the concepts)   
(3) Ko[(x)(y)[{Ko(x)∧Ko(x→y)}→Ko(y)]]  
(4) Ko(M)     (grounded calculation) 
(5) Ko(Ko(￢Da(M))     ((2), (3), (4)) 
(6) Ko(￢Da(M))     (＊elimination of Ko) 
[(7) Ko(￢Km(￢Da(M))) ∧ Ko(￢Da(M))] 
 
＊The operation at (6) depends on the rule related to the elimination of Ko. Here, I omit the detailed 
argumentation but, intuitively, the rule is not problematic. 
In order to show the efficacy of the cognitive operators Ko and Km and to explicate the relationship 
between the operators, I will provide the other example that induces skeptical doubt about a priori 
knowledge (“M”). 
 
(1) Ko(￢Km(￢Da(M)))     (conclusion from the assumption of Damon)  
(2) Ko(Km(M)→Km(￢Da(M)))     (reasoning based on the concepts)  
(3) Ko[(x)(y)[{Km(x)∧Km(x→y)}→Km(y)]]  
(4) Ko(Km(M))     (assumption)  
(5) Ko(Km(￢Da(M)))     ((2), (3), (4)) 
(6) Ko(￢Km(￢Da(M))) ∧ Ko(Km(￢Da(M)))     ((1), (5)) 
(7) Ko[(￢Km(￢Da(M)) ∧ (Km(￢Da(M))] 
(8) Ko(￢Km(M)) 
 
The operator Km has a quite salient feature in that it cannot be used in the form of Ko(Km(P)) or  
￢Ko(Km(P)) because if the usage of this formula is admitted, it follows that knowledge satisfying  
the Cartesian criteria can exist. (Every well-formed proposition, whether singular or compound, can  
be substituted for P.) Needless to say, the former formula satisfies the criteria. In addition, if it is 
possible to use the latter formula (￢Ko(Km(P)), its empirical denial is necessarily possible.    
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That is, the three propositions can be accepted simultaneously, indicating that both meanings 
of knowledge can coexist in everyday language. 
 
 
VII. Criticism of the Language-game via Descartes 
In the previous section, I attempted to criticize the method of doubt proposed by Descartes, 
based on a perspective grounded in Wittgenstein’s insight, to dissolve the skeptical paradox 
produced by Cartesian doubt. The essence of Wittgenstein’s criticism is 1) if the method of 
doubt is extended exhaustively, it leads to the conclusion that indefeasible knowledge that 
escapes from all logically possible doubt cannot exist; therefore, 2) if we accept the existence 
of any cognition that includes the very idea that 1) attempts to state, we cannot help but 
admit that essentially non-Cartesian criteria for knowledge (= criteria for Ko) have always 
applied or have already been introduced. 
Because Descartes believed knowledge satisfying the criteria for Km—I think—exists, 
he is forced to confront difficulties when he applies the criteria for Km to knowledge that is 
not privileged with regard to the process of skeptical doubt. As a result, he brings about 
skepticism of knowledge despite his intention14. However, Wittgenstein suggests that when 
skeptical doubt is extended to its logical conclusion, the criteria for Km are impossible to 
apply and, paradoxically, we can dissolve the skepticism. It is not that the insight induced by 
skeptical doubt simply evaporates. Indeed, the criteria for Km cannot play any role at the 
ultimate level of our linguistic practice. However, these remain within the scope of the 
criteria for Ko. Thus, the insight of skeptical doubt inevitably maintains its efficacy as a 
philosophical argument15. 
Has Wittgenstein achieved a solid victory over Descartes? Does absolutely certain 
knowledge that escapes any logically possible doubt indeed not exist? I will attempt to use an 
ostensibly naïve perspective to offer counterarguments against Wittgenstein as I retrace the 
process of methodological doubt. 
I am now tapping the keyboard of my PC while listening to the 13th track, Three Dances 
for 2, of John Cage’s Works for Piano & Prepared Piano, Vol.2. Is this not absolutely 
indefeasible knowledge? It cannot be because I might be dreaming and actually be sleeping 
                                                  
14 I will clarify the difference and relationship between Descartes and Wright. With regard to a priori 
knowledge, Wright attempts to draw the impossibility of assuming Damon’s deception (K (￢Da(M))) 
from the logical defect induced by SDa. That is, he thinks we can apply the criteria Km to a priori 
knowledge, almost all of which Descartes excludes from the applicability of Km. Therefore, when 
Wright attempts to apply Km to a posteriori knowledge he is faced with great difficulty.      
15 Please refer to the rather detailed argument contained in footnote 13 for more explanation about the 
relationship between Km and Ko.    
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while lying in bed. Alternatively, I might be a BIV and only hallucinating the images and 
sounds. Indeed, the images and sounds that I am perceiving cannot represent knowledge 
because they do not correspond with events in the real world. But isn’t my belief in my 
hearing the sounds of Three Dances for 2 absolutely certain knowledge? The answer must 
again be in the negative because Damon might be deceiving me into believing the above. 
When Damon terminates the deception, I might say, “I believed that I was hearing the sound 
of Three Dances for 2, but it was not the case. In fact then I believed I was seeing the image 
of The Perilous Night 5.” 
However, room for the following objection remains. Can I doubt the fact that, however it 
might be expressed— “I am hearing the sound of Three Dances for 2” or “I am seeing the 
image of The Perilous Night 5”—a quality or experience enabling me to employ that 
linguistic expression exists? 
To explore Descartes’ criticism, which contains traces of this train of thought, the 
conditions under which absolutely certain knowledge can come into existence, even under 
Damon’s assumption, must be considered. First, in order for any knowledge to achieve 
absolute certainty, the influence of Damon’s deception must be ruled out as impossible. 
Therefore, 1) the meaning of that knowledge must not be understood via use of any sign, 
whether such use be public or private. This is because Damon’s deception might intrude in 
any case in which a sign, such as a sound (the utterance of word) or image (the character of 
word), might be used. In addition, 2) the knowledge must have some cognitive content. 
Without any cognitive content, it cannot be called knowledge. If any knowledge satisfies 
both conditions ((1), (2)), it follows that the knowledge is private; in other words it cannot be 
known to any person other than the holder, because it would be impossible to communicate 
that knowledge to others given that it satisfies condition (1) and thus cannot be based on the 
use of signs. The use of signs, whether the linguistic signs involved in utterances of words or 
characters, or the nonlinguistic signs involving facial expression and gestures, is 
indispensable to sharing knowledge. However, infallible knowledge requires that no sign be 
used in its emergence. Condition (3) thus holds that even though infallible knowledge is 
possible, it can come into existence only privately and cannot be shared with others. 
In brief, the conditions under which infallible knowledge can come into existence are as 
follows: 1) The meaning of the knowledge must be understood without using any signs. 
(Unless this condition is satisfied it is impossible to escape Damon’s deception.) (2) The 
knowledge must have a certain cognitive content. (Otherwise, it cannot be knowledge.) 3) 
The meaning of it is private. (The conclusion of (1)) 
Under the assumption that it is possible that knowledge satisfying the three conditions 
comes into existence, I will refer to the language that enables understanding of its meaning 
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as “private language D” (PLD)16. 
Is PLD impossible? (According to the definition of PLD, this question is equivalent to 
“Is indefeasible knowledge impossible?”.) I cannot help but answer that PLD is possible 
because the instance of PLD is actually given to me. The private quality or experience that 
enables me to use a certain sign always accompanies all my uses of this sign. I cannot even 
imagine the possibility of Damon’s deception’s interfering with the quality or experience. 
Therefore, I must not be able to express the meaning of the private quality or experience by 
using signs. Because, otherwise, there remains room for Damon’s intrusion. Furthermore, I 
cannot doubt that this quality or experience has content. 
I am certain of the foregoing. However, has the argument demonstrated that PLD and 
infallible knowledge are possible? It did not for the following reasons. 
My assertion described above that PLD is given to me has been expressed in a way 
everyone can understand it, that is to say by using the signs of characters. Others might 
interpret it in two quite different and opposed ways. 
The first interpretation is that this instance of PLD exists to this me. The second 
interpretation is that this instance of PLD exists not to this me but to the very person who 
understands my assertion that an instance of PLD exists. 
We can assume that each interpretation can be heard by those who agree with it and 
those who do not. Both cases are logically possible. More effective proof that PLD is 
possible would involve agreement with my claim irrespective of which interpretation is 
adopted because when individuals do not agree with my argument, I will face the additional 
task of refuting their objections in the service of confirming the use of my argument as a 
valid demonstration. However, even though we assume that a more favorable case for the 
validity of my claim might materialize (and the probability of a more favorable case seems 
very strong to me), I can never demonstrate the possibility of PLD. 
                                                  
16 A private language, the impossibility of which Wittgenstein attempts to demonstrate (PLW), appears 
to be defined by following features (cf. PI§243).  
 
1. The signs of the language refer to the immediate and private sensations that can be known to the 
user of the language. 
2. Therefore, only the user can understand the meaning of the language.  
 
PLW is distinguished from PLD by the fact that the use of signs is indispensable to the former. 
Therefore, even though PLW is possible (despite the objection of Wittgenstein), the knowledge whose 
meaning can be understood by PLW cannot be indefeasible because it is impossible for PLW to be 
immune to Damon’s deception. 
In that respect, PLW is essentially different from PLD. However, I think it is possible and probable 
to interpret the private language argument of Wittgenstein as follows: It is not the impossibility of PLW 
but that of PLD that he actually intends to criticize. In consideration of the space limitations of this 
paper, I will provide a more detailed argument on this subject elsewhere.  
110   Ken SHIGETA 
 
I will examine cases in which those who understand my argument agree irrespective of 
which of the two interpretations they adopt. First, one remarkable fact in my argument about 
PLD should be noted: my assertion that the instance of PLD is shown to me is not derived 
from logical deductive reasoning, but from mere empirical means. This claim, in a sense, can 
be considered as belonging to the same category as a claim that there are two PCs in my 
laboratory when the latter is based on perception. Indeed, I developed the three conditions 
required for the existence of PLD based on logical inference, but I cannot deduce the 
existence of PLD from the conditions it is supposed to satisfy17. 
We will examine the second interpretation within the context of this remarkable feature. 
Let us suppose that a certain person, M, agrees with my argument and claims that he does not 
doubt the existence of PLD for himself. However, all that I am able to say about his claim is 
that M believes that PLD exists for him. I can never assert that PLD exists to M. The 
existence of PLD to M is based not on logical reasoning but only on experience. Moreover, 
the PLD existing for M does not actually exist to me. The point here is not that I cannot 
verify whether PLD exists to M but rather that I cannot logically claim that PLD exists to M 
because if I could assert that PLD exists to M, I could not exist apart from M, and I would 
have to be M. Therefore, even though I can conclude that he believes in the existence of PLD 
based on his agreement with my argument (and the conclusion is undoubtedly valid), it is 
impossible for me to draw conclusions about the existence of PLD. 
Next, I will examine the case under the first interpretation. Let us suppose that a certain 
person, M, agrees that PLD exists for me. However, all that he can claim is that I believe that 
PLD exists for me. He cannot draw the conclusion that PLD actually exists for me because 
such a claim could come only from me myself (i.e., if he could claim it he could not be 
someone apart from myself). 
Based on the foregoing examination of the two cases, I can conclude that my empirical 
claim that PLD—that is, absolutely certain knowledge—exists can never be demonstrated 
even under the most favorable assumptive conditions. 
Then, is PLD, that is to say infallible knowledge, impossible? In order to consider this 
question, let us suppose less favorable conditions for my assertions about the previous two 
interpretations. Others might interpret my argument in the second way and deny it. In this 
case, a certain other, for example M, denies the existence of PLD for himself. In fact, this 
type of assertion by another is true to me because insofar as M is other to me, it is impossible 
for his PLD to exist. In such cases, the impossibility of PLD can never be concluded because 
the possibility of my PLD has never been denied, at least in this case. On the other hand, the 
                                                  
17 It can be said that Descartes believes it is possible to draw absolutely certain knowledge, that is, the 
existence of PLD, from logical reasoning. 
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case in which someone else, M, interprets my argument in the first sense and denies it seems 
to give rise to difficulty. In that case, M will deny the existence of PLD for me because I am 
only other to him. However, even in this case the impossibility of PLD cannot be 
demonstrated because the existence of PLD (the only private language that I can understand) 
continues to be shown to me. Although I can never show it anyone else, I cannot help but 
affirm its existence just now when I am writing this letter in this sentence in this section in 
this thesis. 
As per the interpretation in this thesis, Wittgenstein believes that it is possible to 
demonstrate the impossibility of PLD and therefore the impossibility of absolutely certain 
knowledge. If the argument thus far is valid, I must point out that Wittgenstein is mistaken in 
this belief because the counterexample against his claim－PLD－is actually given to this me. 
According to my perspective, when Descartes believes he gains indefeasible knowledge that 
is beyond Damon’s assumption, his belief is fundamentally grounded not in logical reasoning, 
which others can understand, but rather in the existence of PLD. 
Conversely, Descartes was mistaken in his belief that the possibility of PLD, therefore 
the existence of indefeasible knowledge, can be demonstrated in a way that everyone can 
understand and affirm without any logical difficulty. He believes that he can demonstrate the 
existence of indefeasible knowledge—I think—based on logical reasoning. However, using 
the perspective drawn from Wittgenstein’s insight, I have shown a fatal flaw in Descartes’ 
argument. The claim for the existence of indefeasible knowledge cannot be grounded in 
logical reasoning but must emerge as an empirical assertion that can be borne out only by the 
existence of this me. Even though others agree with my assertion in two quite different and 
distinguishable senses, I cannot demonstrate the possibility of PLD and the existence of 
absolutely certain knowledge due to the aforementioned reason. 
I would like to reemphasize that the possibility and existence of PLD is continually 
shown to me. However, even though others understand and agree with this claim, 
interpreting it to mean that from their point of view or my point of view PLD does or can 
exist, I can never demonstrate that PLD, absolutely certain knowledge, is actually possible 
despite Descartes’ intention18. 
 
 
                                                  
18 If the existence of PLD, that is, of infallible knowledge, could be proven, then the possibility of the 
affirmative use of Km would be secured, even though the knowledge could be only private. 
Consequently, the grounds for introducing criteria Ko, as completely distinct from Km, and dissolving 
the skeptical paradox would be fundamentally criticized, which this thesis has shown in §Ⅵ. 
However, this section shows that it is impossible to prove the existence of PLD. Because the possibility 
of using Km affirmatively cannot be proved, the argument in§VI never lost its validity.  
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